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This paper explores the causes and consequences of cross-country variation in mortgage
market structure. It draws on insights from several ￿elds: urban economics, asset pricing,
behavioral ￿nance, ￿nancial intermediation, and macroeconomics. It discusses lessons from
the credit boom, the challenges of mortgage modi￿cation in the aftermath of the boom,
consumer ￿nancial protection, and alternative mortgage forms and funding models. The
paper argues that the US has much to learn from mortgage ￿nance in other countries, and
speci￿cally from the Danish implementation of the European covered bonds system.
JEL classi￿cation: G21, R21, R31.1 Introduction
Residential mortgages are of ￿rst-order importance for households, for ￿nancial institutions,
and for macroeconomic stability. The typical household in a developed economy has one
dominant asset ￿a house ￿and one dominant liability ￿a mortgage. Mortgages are a
major fraction of bank assets, despite ￿nancial innovations that allow banks to securitize
mortgage pools. And the ￿nancial crisis that began in 2007 has made it abundantly clear
that problems in mortgage lending have the potential to destabilize the ￿nancial system and
the economy.
Despite their importance, mortgages have traditionally been a specialty topic in ￿nance,
and most mortgage research has been published in real estate and housing ￿nance journals,
not general-interest ￿nance or economics journals. In this paper I argue that to understand
mortgage markets we need a much broader perspective that integrates insights from across
our discipline: not only from ￿elds within ￿nance such as asset pricing, behavioral ￿nance,
and ￿nancial intermediation, but also from urban economics and macroeconomics. Each of
these ￿elds can be compared to the proverbial blind man groping an elephant, accurately
recording one aspect of the phenomenon but unable to perceive the whole. Here I attempt
a sketch of the whole elephant.
There is striking variation in mortgage market structure across countries. An obvious
question is whether this variation has deep fundamental causes or is the result of historical
accident. To the extent that not all cross-country di⁄erences are attributable to di⁄erent
circumstances, it may be possible to identify best practices in mortgage markets and transfer
them from one country to another. A theme of this paper is that the United States, in
particular, has much to learn from practices in certain parts of Europe.
To set the stage, I graphically summarize key properties of mortgage markets in a range
of developed countries. Figure 1 plots the ratio of residential mortgage debt to GDP in
2009 against the homeownership rate (the fraction of properties that are owner-occupied in
the most recently available data from each country), for sixteen developed countries studied
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2011). The United States is middle-of-the-road
in both respects. The lowest homeownership rates are in northern European countries,
particularly Germany whose homeownership rate is only 43%, while the highest rates are
in southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain with about 80% home-
ownership. The lowest level of mortgage debt (22% of GDP) is in Italy, while the highest
levels (above 100% of GDP) are in Denmark and the Netherlands. It may at ￿rst seem
surprising that homeownership rates are not positively correlated with levels of mortgage
debt; this re￿ ects cross-country variation in house prices, patterns of homeownership (with
many southern European homes owned either by foreigners or by locals who own rural
homes and rent urban apartments), and reliance on family and life-cycle savings to ￿nance
homeownership.
1Although the US has roughly average levels of homeownership (67%) and mortgage debt
(72% of GDP), it is unusual in two other respects. Figure 2 plots the average number of
years that a mortgage carries a ￿xed rate. The lowest values (around 1 year) are in southern
European countries such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy, where adjustable-rate mortgages
predominate. The UK and Ireland similarly rely heavily on adjustable-rate mortgages.
The average ￿xed-rate period is 5 years in Canada, 7-10 years in Belgium, France, and
Germany, almost 20 years in Denmark, and 27 years in the US re￿ ecting a roughly 90%
market share for 30-year nominal ￿xed-rate mortgages. These instruments, which are taken
for granted in the US, are anomalous within the global mortgage system. The dominance
of long-term ￿xed-rate mortgages in the US is likely the result both of a relatively stable
in￿ ation history, and of public policy promoting these mortgages.
Figure 3 plots an index of government participation in housing ￿nance, constructed by
the IMF (2011), against the homeownership rate. The IMF index combines information on
subsidies to home purchases, government funding or guarantees for mortgage loans, prefer-
ential tax treatment for mortgage interest or capital gains on housing, and the existence of a
dominant state-owned mortgage lender. The ￿gure shows that US housing policy is highly
interventionist, more so than any other country illustrated except Singapore. The high value
of the government participation index for the US results from subsidies to low and middle
income homebuyers, subsidized mortgage guarantees by the government sponsored entities
(GSEs), and favorable tax treatment of mortgage borrowing and housing capital gains. The
main stated goal of much US housing policy is to increase the homeownership rate, but
as previously noted the US has only average homeownership, and more generally there is
only a very weak positive cross-country correlation between housing market intervention and
homeownership.2
The remainder of this paper summarizes the literature on mortgages within speci￿c sub-
￿elds. In section 2 I begin with urban economics, a ￿eld that emphasizes externalities from
homeownership and from mortgage foreclosures. Such externalities provide an important
rationale for public policy towards mortgages. In section 3 I present insights from asset pric-
ing, which regards mortgages as ways to share risks between borrowers and lenders. From
this point of view, mortgage defaults and foreclosures are merely another way to allocate
risks. Section 4 turns to behavioral ￿nance, a ￿eld that takes seriously variation across
households in personal circumstances (such as the propensity to move) and ￿nancial sophis-
tication. Behavioral ￿nance can also be used to justify consumer ￿nancial protection in
mortgage markets.
Mortgage loans need to be funded, and the problem of assuring a reliable supply of capital
for mortgage lending is a topic in ￿nancial intermediation. I review insights from this ￿eld
in section 5. Finally, mortgage markets are in￿ uenced by macroeconomic conditions, for
example in￿ ation volatility, and problems in mortgage markets have an important in￿ uence
2Warnock and Warnock (2008) present a detailed cross-country empirical analysis of housing ￿nance
systems, arguing that legal rights, credit information, and macroeconomic stability all encourage the devel-
opment of housing ￿nance.
2on monetary policy and macroeconomic stability. I consider macroeconomic aspects of
mortgages in section 6.
Section 7 combines these insights to evaluate the current state of the US mortgage system,
and options for reform. Section 8 brie￿ y concludes. I argue that there is a legitimate public
interest in a stable, e¢ cient mortgage system and that this is a propitious moment to exper-
iment with mortgage market design, not only through importing design features from other
successful mortgage markets, but also by considering innovations that have been suggested
by ￿nancial economists. Although our theoretical understanding of mortgage markets is still
weak relative to the theory that underpins classic applications of market design (to auctions
and matching problems, for example), ￿nancial theory and theoretically grounded empiri-
cal research will be important for this enterprise. Thus mortgage research o⁄ers ￿nancial
economists an exciting opportunity to contribute to the well-being of society.
2 Urban Economics
An important theme of urban economics is that household decisions about the location,
ownership, and ￿nancing of their residence can have spillover e⁄ects on other households in
the same community. These spillover e⁄ects are hard to measure and hard for society to
handle through the assignment of property rights. Accordingly there may be geographical
externalities that justify policy interventions.
Traditionally, US politicians have emphasized positive externalities from homeownership,
pointing to the fact that homeowners have a greater incentive than renters to take uncompen-
sated actions that bene￿t the community. There is indeed some evidence of stronger civic
engagement among homeowners (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999, Ja⁄ee and Quigley 2011),
although this could just re￿ ect a greater value placed on homeownership by civically minded
people and does not prove that policies to increase homeownership strengthen civic engage-
ment. Also, there are countervailing negative environmental externalities arising from the
dispersed and energy-intensive nature of owner-occupied housing (Glaeser 2011). Nonethe-
less the positive view of homeownership has typically prevailed and has been used to justify
government involvement in the housing ￿nance system.
Fragile housing
Here I focus on a di⁄erent type of externality arising from the fragile nature of single-
family housing. Houses need diligent maintenance and are vulnerable to vandalism. Owner
occupancy is the dominant form of ownership for single-family houses because owner occu-
pants have an incentive to maintain and protect their houses and can do so at lower cost
than absentee owners.
When an owner occupant becomes ￿nancially distressed, the incentive system no longer
3works so well. A distressed homeowner may neglect her property because she fears losing
it to the mortgage lender in a foreclosure ￿in which case the mortgage lender will reap the
bene￿t of maintenance expenditures ￿or because she is tightly borrowing constrained and
e⁄ectively discounts the future bene￿ts of maintenance at a high rate (Melzer 2011). If
foreclosure does occur, the mortgage lender faces the challenges of absentee ownership until
it can sell the house to a new owner occupant. These challenges are particularly severe
in bad neighborhoods where vacant properties may be vandalized, and where ￿xed costs of
protecting houses are large relative to property values.
Campbell et al. (2011a), using Massachusetts data from the 1980s through 2009, compare
the prices of houses sold by mortgage lenders after foreclosure with the prices of comparable
properties sold by owner occupants, and ￿nd an average foreclosure discount of 27%. The
discount is larger for cheaper houses in neighborhoods with low house prices, suggesting the
relevance of vandalism and the costs of protecting against it.
Foreclosure spillovers
While these costs of foreclosure are borne by mortgage lenders, and thus will be re￿ ected
in the structure and pricing of mortgage contracts, Campbell et al. also present evidence
that foreclosures have negative spillover e⁄ects on the pricing of neighboring properties.
Spillover e⁄ects are hard to prove conclusively, because negative shocks to the health of a
local economy will both lower house prices and increase foreclosures in an area, even if there
is no causal linkage from foreclosures to house prices. To get around this problem, Campbell
et al. argue that local economic shocks should not have di⁄erential e⁄ects within a small area
such as a circle with a radius of a quarter-mile. They also argue that reverse causality from
house prices to foreclosures will show up in house price declines that precede foreclosures
rather than following them.
Accordingly, Campbell et al. use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence methodology, showing that a
distance-weighted index of recent foreclosures within 0.1 mile of a house sale predicts the sale
price negatively, after controlling for foreclosures within a quarter mile, and more so than an
index of future foreclosures within 0.1 mile. Their preferred estimate of the causal spillover
e⁄ect is that a typical nearby foreclosure lowers the price of a house by about 1%. This
e⁄ect, like the direct value loss in foreclosure, is stronger in low-priced neighborhoods, and
it appears to be long-lasting because it remains signi￿cant even after lagging the foreclosure
index by a year. These empirical patterns once again suggest that vandalism and crime are
involved in the negative externality from foreclosures. Immergluck and Smith (2006) and
Ellen et al. (2011) present direct evidence linking local criminal activity with foreclosures.3
Negative spillovers from foreclosures are particularly destructive in circumstances where
house prices are already depressed, because then falling house prices readily stimulate more
3Lin et al. (2009) emphasize another channel for the spillover e⁄ect: foreclosed houses sold at depressed
prices are used as comparables by real estate brokers and appraisers. See also Anenberg and Kung (2012)
and Gerardi et al. (2012).
4defaults and foreclosures, which drive down prices further. This mechanism appears to have
been operative in the US during the Great Depression. In the late 1920s, US mortgages
were often short-term balloon loans that required frequent re￿nancing. Low house prices
and reduced bank lending capacity in the early 1930s prevented many homeowners from
re￿nancing, causing a wave of foreclosures that exacerbated the Depression. This experience
was an important motivation for the widespread adoption of long-term amortizing ￿xed-rate
nominal mortgages which have dominated the US mortgage market for the past 70 years.4
More recently, the fear of a foreclosure spiral has motivated the Obama Administration￿ s
programs to modify mortgage terms for borrowers with negative home equity. In 2009
the administration justi￿ed its Making Home A⁄ordable plan as follows: ￿In the absence
of decisive action, we risk an intensifying spiral in which lenders foreclose, pushing area
home prices still lower, reducing the value of household savings, and making it harder for all
families to re￿nance. In some studies, foreclosure on a home has been found to reduce the
prices of nearby homes by as much as 9 percent￿(US Treasury 2009).5
3 Asset Pricing
Asset pricing economists view mortgages as contracts that share various types of risk between
mortgage lenders and borrowers. Long-term mortgages protect borrowers against deteri-
orations in their own creditworthiness or in credit market conditions. That is, borrowers
with existing mortgages are not required to put up more collateral if they enter ￿nancial
distress, or if the standards for underwriting new mortgages become tighter. These protec-
tions are taken for granted by mortgage and other retail borrowers, but they do not exist in
other types of collateralized borrowing used by corporations and ￿nancial institutions, such
as repurchase agreements. Presumably the reason has to do with the often limited access
of mortgage borrowers to unsecured credit markets, and the high costs of foreclosures as
documented in the previous section.
FRMs and ARMs
Even when lenders bear the risks of changing borrower circumstances and credit market
conditions, there remain numerous questions about the distribution of other risks, speci￿cally
real interest rate, in￿ ation, and house price risks. To understand how di⁄erent mortgages
can allocate these risks di⁄erently, consider two simple cases: a nominal ￿xed-rate mortgage
4Amortizing ￿xed-rate mortgages did exist before the Great Depression, and were particularly favored
by savings and loans institutions which had a large market share in mortgage origination (Morton 1956,
Chapter 2). However, average maturities were considerably shorter than they are today (Grebler, Blank,
and Winnick 1956, Chapter 15).
5There is also the possibility that foreclosures encourage neighbors to default, not by lowering their house
prices but through a direct mechanism such as learning or a reduction of the stigma associated with default
(Goodstein et al. 2011).
5(FRM) and a nominal adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM).
A standard FRM has a level path of nominal payments designed to pay o⁄ the principal
balance as well as interest over the life of the mortgage. The stream of payments is invariant
to changes in the level of real interest rates, and in this sense the borrower is protected against
real interest rate shocks (although of course the present discounted value of the payments,
the market value of the liability, does vary with real interest rates).
The main uncertainty that a⁄ects a nominal FRM borrower concerns the in￿ ation rate
over the life of the mortgage. If in￿ ation accelerates, the real value of the payments declines
rapidly and the borrower bene￿ts in real terms while the lender su⁄ers. This was the
situation in the US during the late 1960s and 1970s. If in￿ ation decelerates, or in the
extreme if the economy experiences de￿ ation, then the outcome depends on prepayment
penalties and house prices. If there are no prepayment penalties, as is normally the case in
the US, and if nominal house prices are su¢ ciently high, then borrowers can re￿nance their
nominal FRMs to lower rates and they do not su⁄er from low in￿ ation. However if there are
prepayment penalties, as is typical in Germany, or if nominal house prices decline to a level
that prevents re￿nancing, then FRM borrowers are required to make higher real payments
as in￿ ation declines.
The initial mortgage rate compensates lenders for the balance of risks that they bear.
With volatile in￿ ation and low prepayment penalties, nominal FRMs are one-sided bets on
in￿ ation and become extremely expensive in equilibrium.
A standard ARM requires a borrower to pay a ￿ oating nominal interest rate, indexed
to the general level of short-term interest rates, together with small additional payments to
amortize the principal balance. In practice, ARMs often have especially low initial rates
(￿teaser rates￿ ), but for now consider a plain-vanilla ARM without any teaser period. This
mortgage is a ￿ oating-rate note with a relatively stable real market value (since short-term
uncertainty about in￿ ation is small, so most in￿ ation shocks are compensated by variation
in the nominal interest rate). However, the stream of payments is subject to signi￿cant
uncertainty.
If real interest rates increase, then required payments also increase although their present
value does not. If in￿ ation increases, then the timing of the payment stream changes,
with higher real payments early in the life of the mortgage (the result of higher short-term
nominal interest rates), and lower real payments later once in￿ ation has eroded the real
value of the mortgage principal. A mortgage borrower with unused borrowing capacity can
compensate for the increase in early payments by borrowing to ￿nance them, repaying the
additional loan with the additional real income available later in the life of the mortgage. A
mortgage borrower who is constrained, however, faces signi￿cant risk to consumption from
the uncertainty about the timing of repayment implied by an ARM. Campbell and Cocco
(2003) refer to this as ￿income risk￿and contrast it with the ￿wealth risk￿that in￿ ation
creates for an FRM borrower.
6Because the term structure of interest rates is normally upward sloping, both the initial
payments and the expected stream of future payments are normally lower for an ARM than
for a FRM. For this reason, binding current borrowing constraints tend to lead mortgage
borrowers to prefer ARMs. However, the anticipation of future borrowing constraints makes
ARMs risky and may lead borrowers to prefer FRMs. Overall, the preference for ARMs
should be greatest among mortgage borrowers with rapidly increasing income who are buying
large houses relative to their current income. Campbell and Cocco (2003) develop an
optimizing life-cycle model of mortgage choice with these predictions, and Johnson and Li
(2011) present evidence that ARM borrowers tend to be currently borrowing-constrained.
Both the yield spread between short- and long-term bonds and the rational expectation
of future excess returns on long bonds vary over time. These two variables are positively
but not perfectly correlated. If the risk preferences and personal circumstances of mortgage
borrowers have a cross-sectional distribution that is unchanged over time, rational borrowers
with binding constraints are more likely to choose ARMs when the yield curve is steep, to
minimize initial payments, while other borrowers should shift to ARMs when the rational
expectation of long bond returns is high. Campbell and Cocco (2003) emphasize the former
e⁄ect, while Koijen et al. (2009) argue that the latter explains much of the time-variation
in the market share of ARMs in US data.
Default
The analysis above considers the possibility of re￿nancing a mortgage but not the possi-
bility of default. However, the current housing downturn has brought default to the center
of the mortgage literature.
The attractiveness of default to a borrower should vary with ￿recourse￿ , the ability of
the mortgage lender to pursue a defaulted borrower for the balance of the mortgage after
foreclosing on the house. Most European countries have recourse mortgages, as do most US
states with some important exceptions including California. In the US, the practical impact
of recourse varies across states (with details of state law) and over time (with the federal
law governing personal bankruptcy, which can be used to escape recourse). It appears that
US mortgage lenders are less likely to pursue borrowers, even in recourse states, than are
European mortgage lenders. However Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) compare default rates
across US states and ￿nd lower default rates in recourse states, particularly for higher-
priced homes whose owners are likely to have other ￿nancial resources that can be seized by
mortgage lenders.
Even without recourse, default imposes some costs on the borrower: at a minimum, the
cost of moving and damage to the borrower￿ s credit score.6 A defaulted borrower will have
little access to credit for a period of time, making it di¢ cult to buy another house and
forcing a period of rental occupancy. These costs imply that borrowers should not default
6Guiso et al. (2009) emphasize that default imposes additional psychic costs on borrowers who regard
default as immoral or shameful.
7if they have positive home equity (since in this case they can sell the house and pay o⁄
the mortgage without incurring default costs), and even with negative home equity should
not default until negative home equity becomes su¢ ciently large. Default is the exercise
of a ￿real option￿(Deng et al. 2000), and thus the trigger level of negative home equity
should depend not only on default costs but also on the stochastic process for house prices.
Speci￿cally, high expected price growth and high volatility of price shocks should both delay
default by increasing the trigger level of negative home equity.
Borrowing constraints are also highly relevant for the default decision. As borrowing
constraints bind, they increase the marginal utility of consumption today relative to future
marginal utility, and thus increase the e⁄ective rate at which households discount the future.
Since default has immediate bene￿ts (the cessation of burdensome mortgage payments) and
some delayed costs, it will be more attractive when borrowing constraints are binding. That
is, borrowing constraints accelerate default by decreasing the trigger level of negative home
equity.7 Foote et al. (2008) present a two-period model and Campbell and Cocco (2012)
calibrate a multi-period life-cycle model of these e⁄ects.
This theoretical framework implies that negative home equity is a necessary but not
a su¢ cient condition for mortgage default. At low levels of negative home equity, only
￿nancially distressed borrowers with depleted assets and low income￿ perhaps the result of
unemployment￿ will default. As house prices fall, more borrowers will reach the level of
negative home equity that triggers default, and in the extreme, all borrowers will strategically
default. Campbell and Cocco (2012) verify this pattern in simulated data with rational
borrowers. They ￿nd that at modest levels of negative home equity, default rates are low
and defaulters are more distressed than non-defaulters in the sense that their mortgage
payments are larger relative to their current income. At higher levels of negative home
equity, default rates increase and the di⁄erence in ￿nancial distress between defaulters and
non-defaulters disappears.
Bajari et al. (2008), Bhutta et al. (2010), Elul et al. (2010), and Foote et al. (2008)
￿nd patterns consistent with these predictions in recent US data. Li et al. (2010) argue
that the reform of the US bankruptcy code in 2005 made it harder for borrowers to escape
non-housing debt through bankruptcy; by tightening constraints on indebted borrowers, the
bankruptcy reform decreased the trigger level of negative home equity and increased defaults
in the late 2000s.8
Campbell and Cocco (2012) also use their model to compare the default patterns gen-
erated by FRMs and ARMs. They ￿nd comparable overall levels of defaults for these two
mortgage types, but these defaults occur in di⁄erent circumstances. While both types of
7The practitioner literature discusses a ￿dual-trigger￿ model of default, in which both negative home
equity and ￿nancial distress are required for default. It is more accurate to think of a single negative-equity
trigger whose location is in￿ uenced by ￿nancial distress.
8Mitman (2011) presents a theoretical analysis of the interaction between the bankruptcy code and
mortgage default that predicts this e⁄ect.
8mortgages generate high default rates if house prices decline far enough, in states of the
world with modest levels of negative home equity, FRM defaults occur when interest rates
are low (since old FRMs are expensive relative to rental housing), whereas ARM defaults
occur when interest rates are high (since their required payments increase). FRMs are
also somewhat more likely to generate default waves, as idiosyncratic income shocks are less
important drivers of default for FRM borrowers so their default decisions tend to be more
highly correlated.
To summarize, the possibility of default shifts the balance of risks in a mortgage contract.
Lenders bear the risk of extremely low house prices, because borrowers with non-recourse
mortgages e⁄ectively have a put option on their house. The default option also caps the
potential gains to lenders from favorable interest rate movements in states of the world with
moderately low house prices. Naturally these risks are also priced into mortgage interest
rates, which will be higher when lenders believe that default is likely or that default tends
to occur in bad states of the world with high marginal utility of wealth.
4 Behavioral Finance
Behavioral ￿nance confronts the fact that borrowers vary in their personal circumstances,
and in their ability to manage their ￿nancial a⁄airs in their own long-run interest. Three
particularly important types of heterogeneity are in moving propensity, ￿nancial sophistica-
tion, and present-biased preferences.
Moving propensity
There is nothing irrational, of course, about moving from one house to another. But
non-economic considerations are often important motivations for moves, so it is natural to
classify the desire to move as a behavioral in￿ uence on the mortgage market.
With limited exceptions, mortgages in the US are not assumable. That is, a mortgage
collateralized by a speci￿c house cannot be transferred by a departing homeowner to the new
owner of the house. Instead, the departing homeowner must pay o⁄ the old mortgage and
the new owner must obtain a new mortgage. This fact implies that moves have economic
consequences when existing mortgages are more advantageous to borrowers than are new
mortgages.
Such discrepancies between the terms of old and new mortgages are unimportant for
plain-vanilla ARMs, but can be very signi￿cant for FRMs in an environment of rising interest
rates that makes old FRMs cheaper than new ones. In such an environment movers su⁄er
relative to continuing homeowners, if movers are forced to prepay their mortgages at face
value and re￿nance at a higher rate.
The asymmetric treatment of movers and continuing homeowners in FRM systems is im-
9portant for several reasons. First, to the extent that moves are random events for households
(forced by job changes or other exogenous life events), FRM systems create idiosyncratic eco-
nomic risks that are di¢ cult to insure and a⁄ect household welfare ex ante.
Second, uncertainty about the aggregate moving propensity of households is one impor-
tant determinant of prepayment risk, a major factor in pricing mortgage-backed securities.
FRM borrowers have an incentive to avoid moving when interest rates rise, but the magni-
tude of this ￿lock-in￿e⁄ect can be hard for investors to estimate.
Third, asymmetry of information about the moving propensity of individual households
can in￿ uence the structure of the mortgage market. Mortgage lenders have incentives to
separate borrowers by their moving propensity, for example by o⁄ering lower interest rates
in exchange for an up-front fee or ￿points￿in US terminology (Brueckner 1994, Stanton and
Wallace 1998). To the extent that some market participants have more information than
others about the moving propensity of borrowers, mortgage-backed securities markets may
become illiquid as investors fear trading with counterparties who may be better informed.
A unique feature of the Danish mortgage system, which has traditionally been dominated
by FRMs, is that it avoids treating movers and continuing homeowners asymmetrically.
Borrowers are allowed to prepay their mortgages at face value without penalty, as in the US
system; but they can also extinguish their mortgage debt by buying mortgage bonds, which
is economically equivalent to buying back their mortgages at market value. This avoids the
lock-in e⁄ect in an environment of rising interest rates. In addition, Danish mortgages are
typically assumable so that new homeowners can take on mortgages from movers.
Financial sophistication
A great variety of mortgages are available, some of which have complex features that are
di¢ cult even for ￿nancial professionals to thoroughly understand. Mortgage costs appear
in a number of forms, not all of which are straightforward to measure. Households take out
mortgages relatively infrequently, and often negotiate them at the same time that they are
undergoing a major life transition by moving homes. Under these circumstances it is not
surprising that households, particularly those with less ￿nancial sophistication, sometimes
make decisions that appear to be suboptimal.
There is some direct evidence that mortgage borrowers fail to understand the terms of
their mortgages. Campbell (2006) and Schwartz (2006) use the American Housing Survey
(AHS) to show that some self-reported FRM rates are implausibly low given the years in
which the mortgages were taken out. Such misstated rates are more common among less
educated households. Bucks and Pence (2008) compare survey evidence on the adjustability
of ARM rates to administrative data on ARM terms, and show that households collectively
underestimate the extent to which their ARM rates can rise.
Many observers have been concerned that borrowers pay excessive fees to mortgage bro-
kers. Woodward (2004) and Woodward and Hall (2012) show that complex mortgage terms
10are associated with higher fees paid to mortgage brokers, especially by less educated house-
holds.
The decision to re￿nance a FRM is challenging for many households. Campbell (2006)
presents evidence that in the late 1990s and early 2000s many households, particularly poorer
and less educated ones, paid higher mortgage rates than necessary. In AHS data, 12-14% of
households were paying more than 2 percentage points above the prevailing mortgage interest
rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s; this ￿gure rose above 25% in 2003 after steep drops
in interest rates made re￿nancing particularly advantageous. These results are unlikely to
be explained by credit deterioration (proxies for which are measured in the AHS) or lack of
home equity given the buoyant housing market of the period.
Re￿nancing is also important for borrowers with ARMs that o⁄er low initial ￿teaser￿
rates. Such features are common in both the US and the UK, and they create an economic
incentive to re￿nance ARMs at the end of the teaser period. Miles (2004) shows that in
the early 2000s, about a third of UK borrowers had not re￿nanced and were paying higher
￿standard￿rates. In the economic environment of the time, it is unlikely that more than
a fraction of these borrowers were prevented from re￿nancing by negative home equity or
income shocks; instead, this was likely a mistake by less sophisticated borrowers.
It is also possible that borrowers make mistakes when choosing between ARMs and FRMs.
Campbell (2006) argues that lagged changes in long-term interest rates in￿ uence the market
share of ARMs in a way that is hard to rationalize, although Koijen et al. (2009) argue that
a rational model of mortgage choice ￿ts US data well.
Mistakes by mortgage borrowers have several important implications for equilibrium in
the mortgage market. Random variation in the incidence of these mistakes creates an
arti￿cial risk that must be managed by mortgage investors. It is ironic that prepayment
risk, the subject of sophisticated modeling e⁄orts by mortgage-backed security experts in
the 1990s and 2000s, is caused by consumers￿inability to handle the excessively complex
prepayment option built into a conventional FRM.
The pro￿ts generated by mortgage mistakes are competed away in a competitive market
for mortgage origination. One e⁄ect is that originators and brokers pay high marketing
costs as they compete for the business of naive mortgage borrowers. A second e⁄ect is that
mortgage rates fall, so sophisticated borrowers bene￿t at the expense of unsophisticated
ones.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) have argued that this second e⁄ect can inhibit useful ￿nancial
innovation. Consider an entrepreneur who designs and markets an automatically re￿nancing
FRM. Such a FRM would be socially bene￿cial because it would eliminate the transactions
costs of conventional re￿nancing, and would protect naive borrowers who fail to re￿nance
conventionally at the right time. However, the new product would be more expensive for
sophisticated borrowers, since it would not o⁄er any cross-subsidy from naive borrowers.
And if the entrepreneur attempted to market the new product to naive borrowers, he might
11￿nd instead that the marketing e⁄ort converted naive borrowers into sophisticated borrowers,
who would then decline to buy the product.
Present-biased preferences
Households with present-biased preferences (Laibson 1997) favor the present over the
future more than they discount the near future relative to the distant future. In other
words, they plan to be patient but succumb to temptation.
Khandani et al. (2009) argue that present-biased mortgage borrowers are likely to extract
home equity when they re￿nance their mortgages, at the expense of their long-run ￿nancial
wellbeing. This temptation exists in all forms of mortgages, but the nominal FRM, with
its strong rational incentive to re￿nance in an environment of rising house prices and falling
interest rates, provides frequent opportunities to succumb. On the other hand Chen et
al. (2011) argue that cash-out re￿nancing tends to occur when local economic conditions
deteriorate (so long as house prices are high enough to permit it), which is consistent with
rational consumption-smoothing by homeowners.9
The same arguments apply to mortgage innovation that increases credit available to
￿rst-time homebuyers. If borrowers are rational and have time-consistent preferences, such
innovation helps them smooth their consumption of goods and housing services over the life
cycle (Piskorski and Tchistyi 2010, 2011). If not, the availability of additional credit may
worsen the temptation to consume too much early in life (Ghent 2011).
5 Financial Intermediation
Mortgage loans must be funded, and this requires the involvement of ￿nancial intermediaries
who originate loans and either hold them or repackage them for sale to ultimate investors.
Other intermediaries may provide guarantees, insuring certain mortgage risks. Whatever
risks borrowers do not bear must be allocated to originators, ultimate investors, or guarantee
providers. Di⁄erent mortgage systems allocate these risks di⁄erently.
The allocation of mortgage risks is important not only because it determines the distri-
bution of gains and losses ex post and the pricing of mortgages ex ante, but also because it
in￿ uences the incentives of ￿nancial intermediaries. A successful mortgage system must give
intermediaries incentives to underwrite properly, gauging the credit risk of borrowers and
setting mortgage rates in relation to that risk. It must also give intermediaries incentives
to modify mortgages if borrowers enter ￿nancial distress and modi￿cation is in the interest
of mortgage holders.
9In a similar spirit Gerardi et al. (2010) show that mortgage innovation has improved the relationship
between housing choice and future income, consistent with a rational consumption-smoothing model.
12Mortgage systems can be classi￿ed into three main categories, which allocate risks and
provide incentives in di⁄erent ways. The oldest system is deposit-￿nanced lending, in which
originators hold loans and issue deposits to ￿nance them. This system has the great merit
that solvent originators have strong incentives both to underwrite mortgages carefully and,
if necessary, to modify them. However, deposit-￿nanced lending also has several serious
disadvantages. First, mortgage supply tends to be limited by the local availability of deposit
funding. Second, deposit-￿nanced lending involves liquidity transformation, since deposits
can be withdrawn on demand while mortgages cannot. This makes deposit-￿nanced lenders
vulnerable to bank runs, particularly in systems without government insurance of retail
deposits and in cases where deposits have been attracted from wholesale money markets
(the UK mortgage lender Northern Rock being a spectacular recent example). Third,
deposit-￿nanced lending usually involves an element of maturity transformation, particularly
when mortgages are ￿xed-rate. This exposes mortgage lenders to fundamental risk from
changes in interest rates. Fourth, the incentives of mortgage lenders can become misaligned
if a negative fundamental shock, from a weak economy or rising interest rates, puts these
intermediaries into ￿nancial distress. The most famous example of this is the US savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s, in which S&Ls, distressed after interest rates increased during
the early 1980s, made risky loans in the knowledge that further losses would be covered by
deposit insurance while gains would accrue to S&L shareholders.
In the years since the S&L crisis, the US has largely shifted to a securitized mortgage
system. In this model, originators package mortgages into pools that can be sold to ultimate
investors. A natural concern in such a system is that originators have better information
about credit risks than mortgage investors do. To handle this, the US system has relied
heavily on credit guarantees provided by the government sponsored entities (GSEs), Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Ultimate investors bear interest rate risk, prepayment risk, and
residual credit risk for types of mortgages not covered by public guarantees. During the
1990s and 2000s, this system allowed US mortgages to become liquid assets funded by global
capital markets rather than by local depositors.
The securitized system also has disadvantages that became glaringly obvious after the
onset of the global ￿nancial crisis in 2007. First, if ultimate investors are ignorant about
credit risk or if credit guarantees are mispriced, originators no longer have the incentives to
underwrite properly. The US experience suggests that government credit guarantees are
particularly hard to price correctly and are vulnerable to political distortion. Underpriced
guarantees encourage originators to make excessively risky loans and pass the losses to tax-
payers. Keys et al. (2010, 2012) present evidence that securitized mortgages were poorly
underwritten in the mid-2000s.
Second, while in principle a securitized system does not expose mortgage originators to
fundamental mortgage risks, in practice originators often hold mortgage-backed securities on
their books either as inventory for their MBS distribution business or because bank capital
regulation favors these investments. Thus originators can become distressed in a securitized
system just as they can in the traditional deposit-￿nanced lending system.
13Third, the problem of capital ￿ ight can also reappear in a securitized system if public
credit guarantees are not fully explicit or credible. This problem a› icted the GSEs in 2007
and 2008 and ultimately forced a government takeover of these institutions.
Finally, a securitized system may not give mortgage servicers the proper incentives to
modify mortgages in a housing downturn, both because servicers bear modi￿cation costs
without receiving bene￿ts, and because the ultimate owners of mortgage-backed securities
may have divergent interests. The scale of this problem in the recent crisis is actively
debated: Adelino et al. (2009) and Foote et al. (2010) minimize its importance, while
Agarwal et al. (2011) and Piskorski et al. (2011) argue that it is serious.
The last major mortgage system, common in Europe, uses covered bonds to address
some of the problems described above. Covered bonds are claims on originators but are
collateralized by pools of mortgages. Importantly, the underlying mortgages remain on the
books of originators, who must replenish the collateral pool when individual mortgages in
the pool default. Thus originators continue to have strong incentives both to underwrite
mortgages carefully and to modify them when that is in the interest of mortgage lenders.
Covered bond systems permit maturity transformation (when the maturity of the bonds
di⁄ers from the maturity of the underlying mortgages), and this can create problems similar
to those of a deposit-￿nanced lending system. However, in countries that have limited
maturity transformation, covered bond systems have been impressively stable.
In both securitized and covered bonds systems, it is essential that ￿nancial instruments
backed by mortgages trade in liquid markets. To maintain liquidity, these systems must
minimize information asymmetries. Ways to do this include packaging mortgages into
large, diversi￿ed pools; designing mortgages to limit their exposure to personal circum-
stances and behavioral uncertainties; tranching pools of mortgages to create instruments
that are protected against prepayment or default; and providing public credit guarantees.
Many observers have praised the Danish mortgage system, which emphasizes the ￿rst two
approaches.
6 Macroeconomics
The form of the mortgage system has the potential to in￿ uence macroeconomic outcomes,
principally by altering the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the political
constraints on the central bank. In turn, the macroeconomic history of a country has a
powerful in￿ uence on its mortgage system.
Increases in interest rates have di⁄erent e⁄ects on homeowners with FRMs and ARMs.
The mortgage payments of FRM borrowers remain unchanged when current interest rates
increase, so in a FRM system monetary policy has a direct e⁄ect only on new borrowers
(although existing borrowers are of course a⁄ected by house prices and other consequences
14of monetary policy). In an ARM system, on the other hand, all existing homeowners make
higher payments when interest rates increase. This can have a powerful e⁄ect on household
consumption, especially if a signi￿cant fraction of homeowners are borrowing-constrained.
For the same reason, the political economy of monetary policy varies with the nature of
the mortgage system. In a FRM system where mortgages are ￿nanced through maturity
transformation, as in the traditional US system of deposit-￿nanced lending, the central bank
may be reluctant to raise interest rates for fear of creating ￿nancial distress among mortgage
lenders. This may have been one reason for the weak Fed response to rising in￿ ation during
the 1970s. In an ARM system, on the other hand, increases in interest rates can be highly
unpopular with homeowners and this may create political pressure to keep interest rates low.
ARM and FRM systems also generate di⁄erent patterns of default in an environment with
declining house prices. If the central bank responds to such an environment by lowering
interest rates, ARM borrowers bene￿t from lower required mortgage payments, but FRM
borrowers do not if negative home equity prevents them from re￿nancing their mortgages.
In this respect it is unfortunate that the US, with unusually low interest rates in the recent
downturn, has a predominantly ￿xed-rate mortgage system so that only homeowners with
positive home equity can bene￿t from the low interest-rate environment.
On the other hand, ARM systems can generate default waves when in￿ ationary shocks
force the central bank to increase interest rates. Figure 4 illustrates two waves of ￿nancial
distress experienced in the UK, where ARMs predominate. The ￿gure plots bankruptcy
orders, rather than mortgage defaults, as this series is readily available over a long period
of time and positively correlated with mortgage defaults and foreclosures. The bankruptcy
series spikes up in the early 1990s, shortly after an increase in in￿ ation and nominal interest
rates at the end of the 1980s that increased the required payments on ARMs. The bank-
ruptcy series also spikes up in the late 2000s, despite the fact that in￿ ation and interest rates
were low, because declining house prices and poor macroeconomic conditions outweighed the
payment relief on ARMs at this time.
All these considerations make it awkward to run a common monetary policy in an area
with heterogeneous mortgage systems. In the early 2000s, British concern about this prob-
lem was one justi￿cation for the UK to keep its own currency rather than joining the euro,
and the Miles Report (2004) was originally commissioned by Chancellor Gordon Brown to
study whether the UK should try to harmonize its mortgage system with those of major
eurozone economies.
Conversely, the variation in mortgage systems across developed countries appears to be
related to their macroeconomic history. Speci￿cally, a history of volatile in￿ ation is strongly
associated with the use of ARMs, as shown in Figure 5. Because many of the countries
included in the ￿gure are members of the eurozone, in￿ ation volatility is calculated over the
pre-euro period of 1977-1999. A natural explanation for the pattern shown in Figure 5 is
that volatile in￿ ation makes nominal FRMs with prepayment options excessively risky for
15lenders and therefore too expensive for borrowers.10
Of course, this raises the interesting question of why mortgage systems in southern Europe
have remained ARM-dominated even after the introduction of the euro. It appears that
there is substantial inertia in mortgage systems, possibly resulting from the di¢ culty and
expense of educating borrowers about mortgage contracts that may be unfamiliar to them
even if common in other countries.
7 Prospects for the US Mortgage System
In this paper I have presented insights from ￿ve di⁄erent ￿elds ￿urban economics, asset
pricing, behavioral ￿nance, ￿nancial intermediation, and macroeconomics ￿about the oper-
ations of mortgage systems. I conclude by using these insights to discuss future prospects for
the US mortgage system. In turn, I will discuss lessons from the credit boom; the challenge
of modifying mortgages to reduce foreclosures; alternative forms for mortgage contracts;
consumer ￿nancial protection; and ￿nally alternatives for funding mortgage lending.
Lessons from the credit boom
The preceding analysis provides the necessary ingredients to understand recent problems
in the housing market. These problems arose from a boom and subsequent collapse in both
house prices and mortgage lending, and the e⁄ects of the collapse on leveraged borrowers
and mortgage lenders. There is an active debate about the deeper causes of these events.
Some economists, notably Foote et al. (2012), emphasize overoptimistic expectations
about the future path of house prices during the boom, and downplay institutional features of
the housing ￿nance market as being either static or changing merely in response to optimistic
price expectations.
A second view is that excessive household leverage was encouraged by longstanding US
policies, particularly the tax subsidy to mortgage-￿nanced owner occupancy. Economists
have long questioned the appropriateness of subsidizing leveraged homeownership in this way
(Glaeser and Shapiro 2003).
A third view is that the problems had recent institutional origins in looser underwriting
standards (Mayer et al. 2009) that increased the supply of mortgage lending (Mian and
Su￿2009), and in mortgage innovation during the credit boom of the early and mid 2000s.
At this time many new types of mortgages appeared (Committee on the Global Financial
System 2006, Scanlon et al. 2008). While terminology varies from country to country
10An alternative response to a volatile in￿ ation history is to denominate mortgages in foreign currency.
During the credit boom, foreign-currency mortgages were popular in countries such as Iceland, Poland, and
Russia. Domestic-currency depreciation during the ￿nancial crisis made these mortgages una⁄ordable for
borrowers, many of whom defaulted.
16(frequently used terms include interest-only, hybrid, ￿ exible, and option mortgages), the
common feature of these new mortgages is that required payments are low initially ￿because
the initial interest rate is low, and often also because principal is not initially repaid ￿and
then payments increase discretely after a few years. Lower required payments make it
possible to increase the amount borrowed if banks apply a ￿xed ratio of mortgage payments
to income to judge mortgage a⁄ordability. Amromin et al. (2011) show that in the US
market, these new mortgages were typically used by prime borrowers buying large houses
relative to their income.
Mortgages of this sort create a strong incentive to re￿nance at the moment when re-
quired payments increase. Anticipating that creditworthy borrowers will re￿nance, mort-
gage lenders set high rates for those who do not. In an environment with fully rational and
time-consistent borrowers and lenders, and no foreclosure externalities, this structure can be
a good approximation to the solution of an optimal dynamic contracting problem (Piskorski
and Tchistyi 2010, 2011). However, it can create several problems if these assumptions
fail. First, borrowers with present-biased preferences may borrow and consume too much
when o⁄ered larger mortgages (Ghent 2011, Mian and Su￿2009). Second, unsophisticated
borrowers who fail to re￿nance when they can do so will cross-subsidize more sophisticated
borrowers, the problem identi￿ed by Miles (2004). Third, the system relies on the availabil-
ity of re￿nancing. It breaks down when house prices fall and credit conditions deteriorate,
and in these circumstances lenders may have to protect their interests by foreclosing. Thus
the new mortgages of the 2000s are similar to the ￿ve-year balloon mortgages of the 1920s
in their potential to generate economically damaging foreclosure waves.11
Mortgage modi￿cation
There is a great deal of concern about the high level of foreclosures since 2007. Some
observers argue that given the loss of value in foreclosure, private lenders should slow fore-
closures, or modify mortgages to reduce payments for a period of time, or even write down
principal. An obvious objection is that if this were optimal for lenders, they would do it
voluntarily. This can be countered in two ways.
A ￿rst argument is that securitized mortgages create con￿ icts of interest between mort-
gage servicers and ultimate investors; servicers bear more of the costs of modi￿cation, while
investors receive more of the bene￿ts, and this agency problem causes insu¢ cient modi￿ca-
tion. Several recent papers compare modi￿cation rates and outcomes for securitized and
directly held mortgages (Adelino et al. 2009, Agarwal et al. 2011, Foote et al. 2010, Piskorski
et al. 2011).
A second argument is that negative externalities from foreclosures make the socially
11Corbae and Quintin (2010) calibrate a dynamic equilibrium model that captures this e⁄ect. Foote
et al. (2012) point out that the decline in short-term Treasury bill rates during the ￿nancial crisis o⁄set
the increase in credit spreads caused by mortgage rate resets; however, it is still the case that rate resets
prevented borrowers from bene￿ting from falling interest rates as they would have done if they had taken
out plain-vanilla ARMs.
17optimal foreclosure rate lower than the privately optimal one. Mian et al. (2011) argue
that US states that slow down foreclosures have recently performed better than those that
allow rapid foreclosures; Gerardi et al. (2011) counter that slower foreclosures still take
place eventually, generating the same or perhaps even greater external e⁄ects as houses are
occupied for longer periods of time by distressed owners.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of this debate, it is clear that mortgage modi￿cation
is much more costly ￿and perhaps prohibitively so ￿if undistressed borrowers who would
otherwise pay their mortgages in full manage to obtain modi￿cation (Mayer et al. 2011). To
avoid this, White (2009) suggests using the bankruptcy courts, allowing bankruptcy judges
to modify mortgages in bankruptcy when this would be in the interest of mortgage holders.
Congress discussed this as a retroactive measure (￿cramdown￿ ) during the global ￿nancial
crisis, but ultimately rejected such an ex post alteration of mortgage contracts. However,
it may well make sense as a standard feature of future mortgages.
Whether mortgages are modi￿ed by lenders or by bankruptcy judges, an important issue
is how to structure such modi￿cations to minimize the probability of subsequent re-default.
Das (2011) argues that principal reduction is most e⁄ective in this regard, and Doviak and
MacDonald (2011) and Haughwout et al. (2010) provide supporting empirical evidence for
this claim.12
There is also room for policy to reduce the externalities created by those foreclosures
that do occur. To the extent that externalities result from vacant properties, it is appealing
to try to rent out foreclosed homes rather than selling them to new homeowners. The US
government is actively exploring ways to encourage such transitions from owner occupancy
to rental housing. This is consistent with a new appreciation of the economic advantages of
a vibrant rental sector in residential real estate.
Mortgage form
US borrowers and regulators retain a strong attachment to long-term ￿xed-rate mortgages
with minimal prepayment penalties. These traditional FRMs have an overwhelming market
share, especially after the extremely poor performance of complex adjustable-rate mortgages
that were issued during the credit boom of the 2000s. The US system will continue to
rely primarily on FRMs unless a catastrophic increase in in￿ ation volatility makes them
una⁄ordable.
The popularity of FRMs does not, however, justify subsidizing these mortgages through
government intervention. As Lea and Sanders (2011) point out, countries with a greater
reliance on ARMs have just as high homeownership rates as the US, and have done no
worse in the recent downturn. ARMs have the advantage that lower interest rates reduce
12Edmans (2010) proposes a variant of principal reduction, structured as a cash payment to a borrower
at mortgage maturity if all payments are made, and therefore not requiring any modi￿cation of the original
mortgage terms. Mulligan (2010) criticizes federal mortgage modi￿cation programs for favoring interest
reductions over principal reductions and for e⁄ectively increasing marginal income tax rates.
18defaults even when house price declines prevent mortgage borrowers from re￿nancing. And
regulation can limit the complexity of ARMs without favoring FRMs.
Beyond this, economists have suggested several alternative mortgage forms that have
attractive properties relative to standard FRMs and ARMs. First, an automatically re￿-
nancing FRM with no home equity extraction would address several problems that behav-
ioral economists have highlighted with the conventional FRM. By automatically lowering
required monthly payments when long-term nominal interest rates decline su¢ ciently, such
a mortgage would eliminate re￿nancing costs, re￿nancing mistakes, and the temptation to
deplete home equity at re￿nancing dates. Second, an in￿ ation-indexed FRM, whose nom-
inal payments vary in proportion to the price level (not the in￿ ation rate or the nominal
interest rate), would eliminate the in￿ ation sensitivity of a nominal FRM without creating
the instability of payment streams implied by an ARM. Third, a compromise between an
ARM and a FRM could be constructed by gradually adjusting both nominal payments and
the nominal principal balance in response to variation in short-term nominal interest rates.
Such a compromise mortgage would be less in￿ ation-sensitive than a conventional FRM and
would have more stable payments than a conventional ARM.
More radically, some economists have advocated mortgages with principal balances that
automatically adjust to the regional level of house prices (Shiller et al. 2011). This transfers
house price risk from borrowers to lenders without relying on costly foreclosures to do so.13
Consumer ￿nancial protection
A related aspect of mortgage policy is regulation to ensure that borrowers, who are often
￿nancially unsophisticated, understand the choices they are o⁄ered and the fees that go along
with them. Consumer ￿nancial regulation can take several forms surveyed by Campbell et
al. (2011b).
First, regulation can simplify cost comparison of alternative mortgages, in the spirit of
the 1968 Truth in Lending Act (TILA). One way to do this, suggested by Thaler and Sun-
stein (2008, Chapter 8), is to require that mortgage terms be made available electronically
in standardized form to permit the development of online sites for comparison shopping. If
housing tenure and prepayment data were also made available, more realistic cost compar-
isons could be based on historical average behavior, possibly for subgroups of the population,
rather than on arbitrary assumptions such as the standard assumption that a mortgage is
held to maturity.
Second, regulation can facilitate risk evaluation. In this regard it is key to o⁄er house-
holds measures of risk as well as expected cost. Standard annual percentage rate (APR)
13There is a debate about whether homeowners should wish to lay o⁄ house price risk; Sinai and Souleles
(2005) argue that they should not, because houses provide a known stream of housing services to long-term
residents of an area and therefore insure their housing consumption against ￿ uctuations in rents. However,
this motivation for bearing house price risk does not apply to homeowners who plan to downsize, or to move
to a distant location whose house prices are uncorrelated with their current location.
19calculations are helpful for comparing mortgages with similar risks, but not for comparing
FRMs with ARMs, or for comparing ARMs with di⁄erent initial ￿xed-rate periods, interest
rate caps, and other complex features.
Third, regulation can promote standard mortgages. The case for doing this is that one or
two standard mortgages may be reasonable choices for most households; if these mortgages
are o⁄ered as a default option, many households will choose them and this may reduce the
incidence of ￿nancial mistakes. The existence of standard mortgages also simpli￿es the task
of cost comparison, since households can concentrate on standard mortgage terms rather
than considering a vast array of special features. Woodward (2004) and Woodward and
Hall (2012) present evidence that simple mortgage forms are associated with lower fees,
particularly for less sophisticated borrowers.
In the past, US government sponsorship of the GSEs subsidized long-term nominal FRMs
and helped them become de facto standard mortgages. The disadvantages of this approach
have been discussed above. A more explicit regulatory policy favoring certain mortgages, for
example by lowering capital requirements on banks holding them, or by requiring consumers
to qualify for non-standard mortgages, would be a preferable alternative.
A fourth response to the problems consumers face in choosing mortgage products is to
regulate the mortgage origination process. The Safe Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 aims
to establish minimum state standards for licensing mortgage originators. A more drastic
approach would be to establish a ￿duciary duty for mortgage brokers ￿that is, a legal duty
that they use their best judgment in acting in the best interest of borrowers.
Given the limitations of existing mortgage contracts, it is important that regulation of
mortgages should not be so heavy-handed that it precludes experimentation with new ideas.
One possible role for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is to encourage small-scale
experimentation with promising new mortgage forms. Consumer ￿nancial protection may
also help constructive mortgage innovation indirectly, by reducing the cross-subsidies from
naive to sophisticated borrowers that help to entrench confusing but commonly used forms
of mortgages.
Mortgage funding
The funding model that developed in the US during the 1990s and 2000s has become
dependent on a level of government intervention that is probably unsustainable. The GSEs
have been in government conservatorship since September 2008, but they continue to hold
large mortgage portfolios and to provide credit guarantees. There is consensus among many
economists that a way must be found to restore private funding of mortgages with less
reliance on taxpayer guarantees.14
Under these circumstances I agree with Lea (2011) that it is wise to look overseas to see
14See for example Acharya et al (2011), Baily (2011), Fuster and Vickery (2012), Ja⁄ee and Quigley (2011),
and US Treasury and Department of Housing and Urban Development (2011).
20if lessons from foreign markets can be applied to the US. A particularly promising model
is the Danish mortgage system, because Denmark has traditionally used FRMs with no
prepayment penalties, much like those favored in the US, and because the Danish system
proved relatively stable even during the global ￿nancial crisis (Gyntelberg et al. 2012).
The Danish model has several appealing features. First, mortgages are funded using
callable covered bonds with strict limits on maturity transformation. As mortgage demand
has shifted towards shorter-term bonds in the last few years, mortgage bond maturities have
declined in parallel. The use of covered bonds exposes Danish mortgage lenders to credit
risk, which has desirable incentive e⁄ects, while interest-rate risk is transferred away from
deposit-￿nanced institutions and towards long-term investors who are better able to bear
it.
Second, the Danish system treats movers and continuing homeowners equally, by allowing
movers either to buy back mortgage bonds in the market or to pass their mortgages on to
new homeowners when rates increase. These provisions eliminate the e⁄ects of idiosyncratic
moving uncertainty on individual welfare, and an important source of aggregate uncertainty
in pricing mortgage bonds. The ability of homeowners to e⁄ectively re￿nance by buying
mortgage bonds also provides a source of liquidity for the mortgage market in a crisis; if
investors dump mortgage bonds, homeowners can buy them just as companies can buy back
their stock during a market crash.
Third, the Danish system constructs large, nationally diversi￿ed mortgage pools that
therefore are relatively liquid because there is little incentive to obtain private information
about the underlying mortgages.
Finally, defaults and foreclosures have been a less serious problem in Denmark, despite a
large recent decline in house prices, because of a combination of strict regulation, conservative
underwriting incentivized by the covered bond system, and the use of recourse mortgages.
During the ￿nancial crisis, the central bank did have to intervene to ensure adequate funding
of mortgage lenders, but the degree of intervention appears to have been much smaller than
was required in the US.
The US has had some limited experience with covered bonds, notably those issued by
Washington Mutual (Bergstresser et al. 2009). WaMu￿ s covered bonds paid o⁄ in full,
despite the originator￿ s bankruptcy in September 2008. Congress has recently considered
legislation to provide a statutory framework for covered bonds in the US. One challenge is
how to reconcile the protection of covered bondholders with the obligation of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to resolve failed banks at minimum cost to taxpayers.15
In addition, since covered bonds keep credit risk on the books of mortgage originators, they
15See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011) and US Treasury (2008) for recent statements on
covered bond design issues in the US context. The key issue is whether, upon the failure of a mortgage
originator, the collateral for covered bonds is sequestered for the life of the bonds, or whether the FDIC has
the right to pay o⁄ the covered bonds at par and reclaim the collateral as it resolves the failed originator.
21imply that ￿nancial institutions are exposed to the risk of an aggregate house price decline.
If the US moves towards greater use of covered bonds, it may be useful to develop derivatives
markets to allow US ￿nancial institutions to hedge their aggregate house price exposure.
8 Conclusion
There is a strong public interest in an e¢ cient and stable housing ￿nance system. An un-
regulated system may generate ine¢ ciencies in several ways, including negative externalities
from foreclosures, ￿nancial system instability, and high costs for unsophisticated borrowers.
The US has a complex regulatory and tax regime for mortgages that has evolved with the pri-
mary goal of promoting homeownership, but is not obviously successful in this regard. This
regime has many unintended consequences that have become particularly obvious during the
recent ￿nancial crisis.
In the long run, it may be possible for economists to solve the optimal dynamic contract-
ing problem and recommend an ideal mortgage system on this basis. At this time, however,
it is too hard to do this exercise without assuming away the market failures that justify
mortgage regulation in the ￿rst place. For now, mortgage market design must proceed in a
more ad hoc and ￿ exible fashion, learning from international experience￿ for example, from
the Danish implementation of the European covered bonds system￿ and integrating insights
from di⁄erent ￿elds including urban economics, asset pricing, behavioral ￿nance, ￿nancial
intermediation, and macroeconomics.
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